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11 Introduction
By now, it is well-known that indeterminacy of the equilibrium path can arise in an optimal growth
framework when externalities are introduced into production. Seminal work by Benhabib and
Farmer (1994, 1996) demonstrates that externalities-generated increasing returns to scale may give
rise to indeterminacy. More recently, Benhabib and Nishimura (1998) and Benhabib, Meng and
Nishimura (2000) prove in multi-sector models that constant returns to scale production possessing
mild externalities may also cause indeterminacy to arise. Importantly, they have heightened interest
in the existence of endogenous ﬂuctuations in the macroeconomics literature.
This paper examines whether indeterminacy or uniqueness of the equilibrium can be “trans-
mitted” across countries.1 In particular, we ask what the eventual steady state properties of a
two-country world would be if trade is introduced between a country that features indeterminacy
under autarky and a country that does not. We believe this question has important implications
for the empirical literature that is largely closed economy oriented: while indeterminacy may be
empirically observed in closed economy analysis, both determinacy and indeterminacy are possible
outcomes when trade takes place.
Our study is based largely on the seminal work of Nishimura and Shimomura (2002), who
examine a two-country Heckscher-Ohlin model under sector-speciﬁc externalities.2 In our exercise,
we break the symmetry in which externalities enter the production function in the two countries.
The simplest way to do so is to remove the sector-speciﬁc externalities in one country while keeping
them in the other country consistent with the original framework. By setting up our problem in
this manner, we obtain a starting point where determinacy holds under autarky in the ﬁrst country
and indeterminacy in the second. We then ask whether indeterminacy can be eliminated when
trade is engaged with the country having a determinate equilibrium under autarky, or conversely,
whether the initially saddle-path stable country would end up importing indeterminacy instead.
A technical issue arises with our modeling assumption however - the integrated equilibrium is
no longer supportable since returns to private factors always diﬀer across countries. Our solution
proceeds by imposing that factors of production are internationally immobile. The clear beneﬁt of
doing so is to minimize the interation between the two countries, that is, to keep each country as
“separate” as possible, so as to isolate the eﬀect of trade on the dynamic properties in the model.
The main ﬁnding of our experiment is that trade may overturn local indeterminacy that previously
exists under autarky. Understanding that many outcomes are possible in the class of models we are
working on, including indeterminacy under trade, we wish to highlight our special case as it will
1Although their focus is not on indeterminacy, Nishimura and Yano (1993) are among the very ﬁrst to theoretically
examine how a country’s pre-trade capital accumulation pattern may coincide or not with its and the world’s aggregate
post-trade patterns, which in fact is an investigation on the transmission of capital accumulation patterns via trade.
2Nishimura and Shimomura (2002) show that when private and social factor intensity rankings are the reverse
of the other, indeterminacy of the equilibrium path in the world market is possible. Their seminal model assumes
indeterminacy in each country before trade while we change that assumption in our analysis.
2complement the seminal ﬁndings of Nishimura and Shimomura (2002) and others in the literature.
Our main result may be compared to some recent and key contributions. Specializing the model
in Nishimura and Yano (1993) to Cobb-Douglas technologies, Nishimura, Venditti and Yano (2006a)
show that endogenous two-period cycles at the world level may be derived from endogenous ﬂuctu-
ations existing in one country under autarky despite the autarkic equilibrium path of the trading
partner is monotonically convergent. In an extension to include sector-speciﬁc externalities in a
two-country, two-good, two-factor model, Nishimura, Venditti and Yano (2006b) show that market
integration with a country exhibiting constant returns at the social level and local indeterminacy
may have destabilizing eﬀects for some countries. They have assumed capital to be internationally
mobile while we have immobility to focus on the eﬀect of trade. It would be interesting to extend
our work to incorporate capital mobility in the future for further investigation and comparison.
For the rest of the paper, Section 2 shows that the uniqueness of the equilibrium path can exist
when trade takes place between two countries, one with a locally indeterminate equilibrium under
autarky and the other with a locally determinate equilibrium. Section 3 concludes.
2 The Model
The model is outlined as follows. Consider the home country ﬁrst, which is populated by an




where C denotes the home country’s consumption and 1/η ∈ (1,∞) represents the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in consumption. Let both consumption good and investment good, with
the latter given by I, be produced with the Cobb-Douglas technology. The household’s intertem-


























K = KI + KC and L = LI + LC (3)
˙ K = ˆ I + p ˆ C − δK − pC (4)
K(0) given
where p is the price of consumption in terms of investment, ρ ∈ (0,∞) is the subjective rate of time
discount, and K(0) is the initial capital stock. Equation (2) describes the production frontier based
on Benhabib and Nishimura (1998), where ˆ C and ˆ I is output level of consumption and investment
3goods.3 The private factor shares of labor and capital in sector i = I,C are measured by ai and
bi and the externalities associated with labor and capital are given by Li and Ki. In both sectors,
production exhibits constant returns to scale from the social perspective, i.e. ai +αi +bi +βi = 1,
but decreasing returns to scale from the private perspective, i.e. ai+bi < 1. Equation (3) describes
the resource constraints for capital and labor, both of which are perfectly mobile across sectors.
Equation (4) is capital accumulation process where δ ∈ (0,1) is the capital depreciation allowance.





















C − ˆ C) + r(K − KI − KC) + w(L − LI − LC)
where PI, PC, r and w are the Lagrange multipliers representing the shadow price of investment,
consumption, capital and labor respectively. The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to ˆ I and ˆ C are
λ = PI
λp = PC
Combining the above, one has p = PC/PI. Deﬁning r = r/PI and w = w/PI, we can express the
remaining necessary conditions as



































˙ λ = λ(ρ + δ − r) (8)
lim
t→∞
K(t)λ(t)e−ρt = 0 (9)
Equation (5) expresses the equality between the marginal utility and the marginal cost of consump-
tion while (8) represents the intertemporal arbitrage condition. Equations (6) and (7) state the
equalization of the marginal revenue product of labor and of capital across sectors. Equation (9) is
the transversality condition. Note that (6) and (7) consist of four equations in four unknowns in LI,
LC, KI and KC. They are implicitly solved in terms of w and r, which are in turn determined after
p is obtained. The relationship between total income from the private and the social perspectives
can be expressed as
wL + rK + Π = WILI + RIKI + WCLC + RCKC

= ˆ I + p ˆ C

(10)
3Since this is a two-country model, the distinction between the actual consumption and investment levels with
the actual output levels has to be made because only under autarky can we conclude that market clearing implies
C = ˆ C and I = ˆ I.
4where Π is the ﬁrm’s proﬁt due to private decreasing returns to scale, Wi and Ri are the social
wage and rental income in sector i respectively. Using the fact that production functions exhibit
constant returns to scale, Li and Ki can be expressed as functions of Wi and Ri. This is done by
















1 if i = I,
p if i = C.
Note that Wi and Ri may diﬀer across sectors, since factor allocation across sectors only depends
on private returns, which are equalized for each input in equilibrium. Equations (11) and (12) can
be equivalently expressed as
Wili = piθi (13)
Riki = pi (1 − θi) (14)
where li and ki are the unit labor and capital requirement respectively. Using (13) and (14), the
two social zero proﬁt conditions in the goods markets are
1 = WIlI + RIkI (15)
p = WClC + RCkC (16)
Due to social constant returns to scale, the unit input requirements are functions of social income









By substituting the social income levels from (17) and (18) into (15) and (16), and log-diﬀerentiating













5where θC − θI measures the social factor intensity ranking. θC − θI > 0 holds if labor is socially
more intensive in the consumption sector, and the inequality reverses if the converse is true. It
turns out that the Stolper-Samuelson conditions, which express the price elasticities of wage and
rental income, are the same even when production externalities are absent.














The system of equations (21) contains two unknowns ˆ I and ˆ C, which can be solved using (13),









where ∆ = aIbC −aCbI measures the private factor intensity ranking. In particular, ∆ > 0 can be
obtained with aI > aC, where labor is privately more intensive in the investment sector, together
with bC > bI, where capital is privately more intensive in the consumption sector. Substituting ˆ I







− δK − pC (24)
Equations (8) and (24) govern the law of motion for the home country.
The foreign country diﬀers from the home country through the absence of sector-speciﬁc ex-
ternalities. Distinguishing the foreign country’s variables by the asterisk, the production functions
are









Assume that the size of the labor force is the same in both countries. The equations governing the
evolution of the foreign country are
˙ K∗ = w∗(p)L + r∗(p)K∗ − δ∗K∗ − pC∗ (26)
˙ λ∗ = λ∗ (ρ∗ + δ∗ − r∗(p)) (27)
where p = p∗ holds with trade. Equations (26) and (27), together with (8) and (24) determine the
dynamics of the two-country world economy. Since social technologies are the same as the home













In equilibrium, the trade balance for consumption good is given by




θIr∗(p)K∗ − (1 − θI)w∗(p)L
p(θI − θC)
(30)
To simplify the analysis, we reduce the system by one dimension. The following lemma and as-
sumption are useful for this purpose.
Lemma 1. There is a constant ξ > 1, determined from r∗(0) = ξr(0), that solves r∗(t) = ξr(t) for
t ∈ [0,∞).
Proof. See Appendix 1. 
Assumption 1.
ρ∗+δ∗
ξ = ρ + δ.
The condition implied by this assumption is time invariant since ξ is a constant. Given the
above, we have
Lemma 2. Under Lemma 1 and Assumption 1, λ∗ = mλξ holds for t ∈ [0,∞).














This expression is integrated to obtain λ∗ = mλξ, where m > 0 is a constant. 







− λ−1/ηp1−1/η − δK (31)
˙ K∗ = w∗(p)L + r∗(p)K∗ − (mλξ)−1/ηp1−1/η − δ∗K∗ (32)
˙ λ = λ(ρ + δ − r(p)) (33)
The steady state price level is obtained by setting ˙ λ = 0 in (33). Totally diﬀerentiating the trade








































. Using (34), (35), (36) and (37), the linearization of (31), (32), and
















Assumption 2. ρ∗ ≥ γ.
Assumption 2 is imposed for simpliﬁcation purpose alone and is very easily satisﬁed under reason-
able parameterization. In addition, we consider w∗0(p)L + r∗0(p)K∗ > 0, which says that national
income of the foreign country increases with the relative price of consumption. Since consumption
good is socially labor intensive, a country with a suﬃciently large labor-capital ratio will fulﬁll this
requirement.
Now consider the following cases. First, suppose ∆ < 0 and θI − θC < 0. In this case, factor
intensity rankings from the private and social perspectives are the same.
Deﬁnition. The equilibrium path is a sequence {p(t),w(t),w∗(t),r(t),r∗(t)}∞
t=0 and {K(t),K∗(t),λ(t)}∞
t=0
such that for each t, the sequence i) solves the representative agent’s problem, ii) satisﬁes (31), (32)
and (33) given the initial stock of capital and the transversalilty condition for each country, and
iii) clears all factor markets and trade balances.
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, ∆ < 0 and θI − θC < 0, the equilibrium path is unique.
Proof. The model’s behavior can be analyzed by straightforward application of the Routh Theo-
rem.4 Since ∆ < 0 and θI − θC < 0, we know that Σ > 0, which implies that both dp/dK and
dp/dK∗ are positive and dp/dλ is negative. Moreover, θI − θC < 0 implies that r0(p) < 0 and
therefore Det(J) < 0. Since Trace(J) contains both positive and negative terms, we consider two
cases:
4The Routh Theorem states that the number of changes in signs in the following scheme
-1 Trace(J) −F +
Det(J)
Trace(J) Det(J)
indicates the number of eigenvalues with positive parts, where F is the sum of the minor matrices c11c22 − c21c12,
c11c33 − c31c13, c22c33 − c23c32.
81. Trace(J) > 0. The signs must change twice, regardless of the sign of −F +
Det(J)
Trace(J). Hence,
there are two eigenvalues with positive real part and one with negative real part. Since λ is the
only non-predetermined variable, the steady state is saddle-path stable.
2. Trace(J) < 0. Appendix 2 demonstrates that −F +
Det(J)
Trace(J) is always positive if Trace(J) < 0.
Once again, the signs must change twice. Hence, the steady state is always saddle-path stable. 
Next, consider ∆ > 0, θI − θC < 0 and Σ > 0. In this case, private and social factor intensity
rankings diﬀer.




















dK∗ > 0 (40)
If the trace is positive, the steady state is saddle-path stable. Otherwise, saddle-path stability
arises for −F +
Det(J)
Trace(J) > 0. This is satisﬁed as long as (40) holds (see Appendix 3). Using (34),
(35), (36), and the fact that C = (λp)−1/η and C∗ = (mλξp)−1/η, we can express (40) as (39). 
We state without proof that under autarky, indeterminacy arises in the home country for ∆ > 0,
θI−θC < 0 and Σ > 0 while the equilibrium path is always unique for the foreign country (available
upon request.) Note that if ∆ < 0 and θI − θC < 0, then there is no factor intensity reversal and
(39) always holds. This reduces to Proposition 1, that is, the equilibrium path is always unique
when there is no factor intensity reversal. The outcome is explained by the fact that the steady
state in both country is saddle-path stable under autarky to begin with. Hence, one can view
Proposition 2 as a generalization of Proposition 1.
More importantly, by relaxing the assumption of identical social technology in Nishimura and
Shimomura (2002), one in which sector-speciﬁc externalities are removed from one country, inde-
terminacy is eliminated whenever (39) is satisﬁed. In other words, Proposition 2 asserts that even
though indeterminacy may arise under autarky, determinacy may be eﬀected through trade. If
the dynamic properties under autarky are preserved under trade, then examining the closed econ-
omy is appropriate. Otherwise, while indeterminacy may emerge from analyzing a closed economy
framework, determinacy may be a possible outcome with trade.
To determine the restrictiveness of the suﬃcient condition, consider the benchmark model:
[Insert Table 1 here]
9Consistent with the empirical ﬁndings, we have assumed very small numerical quantities of exter-
nalities. In addition, we impose aI > aC with bI < bC so that ∆ > 0, otherwise indeterminacy
may not arise. Hence, the benchmark parameters imply that θI −θC = −0.0001 and ∆ = 0.01247.
The lower bound for suﬃciency is larger the closer ξ is to one since ξ > 1. Therefore, we set ξ = 1,
the limiting case, so that if C∗/C satisﬁes the suﬃcient condition for ξ = 1, it will satisfy the
suﬃcient condition for any ξ > 1. Finally, we let ρ = 0.05, δ = 0.05, ρ∗ = 0.05 and δ∗ = 0.05. Since
γ = 0.03019, ρ∗ satisﬁes Assumption 2. Given these values, the suﬃcient condition is met as long
as C∗/C is greater than 0.01307. We have experimented with diﬀerent values ρ, ρ∗, δ, δ∗ but the
lower bound for suﬃciency remains small.5 For example, if sector-speciﬁc externalities are absent
in the U.S. major trading partners, say Canada and Japan, then the private consumption ratios
(in 1997) of 0.05738 with Canada and 0.50633 with Japan indicate that indeterminacy may not
emerge in the U.S. after all even though it appears to be so when viewed from a closed economy
perspective.6
3 Conclusion
The motivation of this paper is to highlight the possibility that indeterminacy may arise under
autarky while determinacy is an outcome given trade. However, with the simplifying assumptions,
our ﬁnding should not be viewed as suggesting that past results based on analyzing the closed
economy are not robust to open economy extensions. Rather, our purpose is to point out that such
non-robustness may be present. A limitation of this paper has been the technical involvement that
makes it diﬃcult to obtain clear economic intuition on our ﬁnding, even though the model presented
here is based upon a well-known dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin framework of Nishimura and Shimomura
(2002) with the injection of production externalities only in one country. Deeper investigation is
necessary for the better understanding of why and when determinacy, or indeterminacy, dominates
when trade takes place between two countries with one experiencing determinacy and the other
indeterminacy under autarky. For instance, it would be interesting to carry out a similar exercise
on previous research by extending these studies to an open economy Ricardian setting, so that
one can inspect the mechanism through which the dynamic properties are transmitted across the
countries and examine the role, if any, of the current account and the terms of trade more closely.
Should sunspots persist in the open economy, then whether there are useful policies in eliminating
sunspots and if so how policies should be conducted, in a coordinated or non-coordinated fashion,
are interesting questions on their own. Moreover, since this paper only considers trade linkages, it
5From the benchmark, we vary in a pairwise manner i) ρ and ρ
∗, ii) ρ and δ
∗, and iii) ρ
∗ and δ from 0.01 to 0.1
while maintaining ξ = 1. To be more precise, for example for i), we keep δ = δ
∗ = 0.05 and vary ρ = ρ
∗ between
0.01 to 0.1. The largest lower bound we ﬁnd is 0.03916, which is obtained for ρ = δ
∗ = 0.05 and ρ
∗ = δ = 0.1. We
have also tried diﬀerent plausible combinations of the parameters and the ﬁnding of a small lower bound generally
remains.
6Based on our calculation from the OECD Business Sector Database.
10would also be worthwhile to consider whether ﬁnancial linkages could act as a channel for trans-
mitting endogenous ﬂuctuations across countries. On this note, we hope to encourage further
research examining the robustness of indeterminacy to open economy extensions, and more impor-
tantly in general, the transmission of equilibrium dynamics through international macroeconomic
interdependence.
Appendix 1
The time argument is introduced for expositional sake. Given K(0) and K∗(0), the initial price
p(0) is determined from (30) after λ(0) and λ∗(0) are chosen. With p(0), r(0) = r(p(0)) and
r∗(0) = r∗(p(0)) are obtained. Hence, there is a constant ξ > 1 that solves
r∗(0) = ξr(0)
The evolution of p(t) depends on K(t), K∗(t), λ(t) and λ∗(t). In turn, the growth paths of r(t)
and r∗(t) depend on p(t). To determine the relationship between the instantaneous growth rates




















gp(t) for t ∈ [0,∞) (A1)
where gr(t) and gp(t) are the instantaneous growth rate of r(t) and p(t). Since p(t)r0(p(t))/r(p(t)) =






gp(t) for t ∈ [0,∞) (A2)
where gr∗(t) is the instantaneous growth rate of r∗(t). At t = 0, the instantaneous growth of K,
K∗, λ and λ∗ along the equilibrium path causes relative price to grow at a rate gp(0). Together
with (A1) and (A2), gp(0) pins down gr(0) and gr∗(0). For an inﬁnitesimally small distance, dt, from
t = 0, the interest rates are
r(dt) =(1 + gr(0))r(0)
r∗(dt) =(1 + gr∗(0))r∗(0)
Since gr(0) = gr∗(0) and r∗(0) = ξr(0), we have r∗(dt) = ξr(dt). Extend the argument from period
t = 0 to t = t and deﬁne γr(t) and γr∗(t) as the average growth rate of r(t) and r∗(t) from t = 0 to





Since gr(t) = gr∗(t) holds for t ∈ [0,∞), therefore γr(t) = γr∗(t) and hence r(t) = ξr∗(t) holds for
t ∈ [0,∞). Since t is arbitrary, set t = t to obtain r(t) = ξr∗(t) for t ∈ [0,∞). 
Appendix 2



























c22 =ρ∗ + Γ
dp
dK∗




























Γ = w∗0(p)L + r∗0(p)K∗ +
(1 − η)(mλξp)−1/η
η
The proof that −F +
Det(J)
Trace(J) > 0 given Trace(J) < 0 is as follows. First, write −F +
Det(J)
Trace(J) >
0 as − 1
Trace(J)(F Trace(J) − Det(J)). Since − 1
Trace(J) > 0, −F +
Det(J)
Trace(J) > 0 if and only if
F Trace(J) − Det(J) > 0. We deﬁne






















12where F = X + Y + Z. Write F Trace(J) as







































The second line is derived by expanding Trace(J) in Trace(J)Y , the third and last line are derived
by expanding both Trace(J) and Z in Trace(J)Z. After rearranging, we obtain























































If ρ∗ −γ is small and ρ and δ are not too large, the last term in (A4) is small. If ρ∗ = γ, this term






























dK∗ − λr0(p) d
dλ

< 0. Hence, Trace(J)(X−γλr0(p)
dp
dλ) >













































. Hence F Trace(J) − Det(J) > 0. 
Appendix 3
The proof that −F +
Det(J)






dλ + ρ∗(λp)−1/η dp









F Trace(J) − Det(J)



































Again, if γ −ρ∗ is small and ρ and δ are not too large, the last term in (A6) is small. This term is
zero if γ = ρ∗. Hence, we approximate (A6) as
F Trace(J) − Det(J)










































> 0. It is easy to





dλ + (λp)−1/η dp
dK + ξ(mλξp)−1/η dp
dK∗

> 0. Finally, Trace(J)(X −
γλr0(p)
dp
dλ) > 0 as before. Therefore, F Trace(J) − Det(J) > 0. 
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